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I. INTRODUCTION 
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) instilled new ur-
gency in the quest to improve America’s public schools.1  NCLB re-
quires schools to meet state-defined performance benchmarks, and 
schools that fail to do so are deemed as in need of “school improve-
ment,” “corrective action,” or “restructuring” and are subject to esca-
lating penalties.2  The most severe sanction occurs after a school fails 
to meet a state’s benchmarks for six consecutive years and, therefore, 
must fundamentally reform its governance operations through the 
process of restructuring.3  NCLB delineates five ways in which a 
school may restructure, one of which is the charter conversion op-
tion, whereby a school reopens as an independent entity but still op-
erates within the public school system.4  Charter schools provide 
autonomous and alternative education models.  Since these schools 
are governed according to state law, however, many states microman-
age charter schools to the point that they are virtually indistinguish-
able from traditional public schools.5  A tension arises between 
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 1 LAUREN MORANDO RHIM, RESTRUCTURING SCHOOLS IN BALTIMORE: AN ANALYSIS 
OF STATE AND DISTRICT EFFORTS 7 (2004), available at http://www.ecs.org/clearing 
house/53/24/5324.doc. 
 2 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b) (Supp. II 2002). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Sandra Vergari, Introduction to THE CHARTER SCHOOL LANDSCAPE 1, 2 (Sandra 
Vergari ed., 2002). 
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NCLB’s focus on fundamental restructuring and charter school stat-
utes that do not allow for a complete overhaul of a school’s govern-
ance structure. 
NCLB imparts lofty goals of achievement and accountability, 
mandates the goal of full proficiency in reading and mathematics by 
the 2013–14 school year, and demarcates steps that state and local 
educational agencies must take to achieve that goal.6  A cornerstone 
of this law is its robust emphasis on accountability, explicit in the no-
tion that the goal of leaving no child behind will be attained only if 
schools are held accountable for improving achievement.7  As a re-
sult, NCLB requires states to track progress through student per-
formance on standardized tests.8  States must use these test results to 
determine whether a school is making progress towards attaining 
proficiency, which is defined under NCLB as Adequate Yearly Pro-
gress (AYP).9  Broadly speaking, AYP is a state-specified benchmark of 
whether a school has satisfactorily improved in its academic perform-
ance towards achieving the long-term goal of proficiency.10
In the initial four years of a school failing to make AYP, NCLB 
requires increasingly remedial actions, beginning with a probationary 
period and culminating in corrective action.11  A school that fails to 
make AYP for one year enters a “warning year,” but the school is not 
sanctioned per se.12  When a school is in its second or third year of 
failing to make AYP, it is labeled as in need of “school improvement,” 
whereby the school district must develop a plan to turn around the 
school, offer choices for students to transfer to non-failing public 
schools, and provide free after-school tutoring from a provider of the 
parent’s choice.13  After four years of failing to make AYP, the school 
is identified as in need of “corrective action,” and the school district 
must take more severe action, such as replacing school staff and insti-
tuting a new curriculum.14
 6 OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., LEA AND SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT: 
NON-REGULATORY GUIDANCE (REVISED) 1 (2006), available at www.ed.gov/policy/ 
elsec/guid/schoolimprovementguid.pdf. 
 7 Id. 
 8 20 U.S.C. § 6311(a)(1) (Supp. II 2002). 
 9 Id. § 6311(b)(2). 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. § 6316. 
 12 REBECCA WOLF DIBIASE, ECS POLICY BRIEF: STATE INVOLVEMENT IN SCHOOL 
RESTRUCTURING UNDER NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND IN 2004–05 SCHOOL YEAR 2 (2005), 
available at http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/64/28/6428.pdf. 
 13 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)–(6). 
 14 Id. § 6316(b)(7). 
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After five years of failing to meet AYP, NCLB requires a school to 
create a plan for restructuring—a complete overhaul of the school’s 
governance.15  If the school fails to meet AYP for a sixth year, it must 
undertake the onerous task of implementing the restructuring plan.16  
NCLB requires that the school fundamentally reform its governance 
operations by choosing one of five restructuring options: (1) charter-
ing, (2) turnarounds, (3) contracting, (4) state takeovers, or (5) 
“other fundamental reforms that alter a school’s governance.”17
Each restructuring option is intended to usher in a systemic re-
form in how the school is governed.18  Chartering involves the school 
district closing the current school and reopening it as a public char-
ter school.19  Turnarounds require the school district to replace all or 
most of the school staff, including the principal, who are relevant to 
the school’s failure.20  Under the contracting option, the school dis-
trict closes the current school and reopens it as a school managed by 
an outside entity, such as a private management company.21  A state 
takeover involves turning over the failing school to the state.22  Fi-
nally, the school district may choose the “other” restructuring option, 
in which the school makes a fundamental reform in the governance 
structure with the “substantial promise of enabling the school to 
make adequate yearly progress.”23
Chartering, when employed within a suitable framework, fulfills 
the central purpose of NLCB’s restructuring provision—
fundamentally reforming the “failing” school’s governance opera-
tions.  This Comment examines the relationship between inflexible 
state charter laws that undermine a charter school’s autonomy and 
NCLB’s focus on restructuring options that radically alter a school’s 
governance operations.  Because chartering is a creature of state stat-
ute, certain charter schools are encumbered by unreasonable restric-
tions.  State laws promulgating stringent requirements of accountabil-
ity are weaker than they may appear at first glance, and, in turn, the 
charter schools are constrained and unable to live up to NCLB’s re-
 15 Id. § 6316(b). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B). 
 18 WOLF DIBIASE, supra note 12, at 2. 
 19 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(i) (Supp. II 2002). 
 20 Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(ii). 
 21 Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(iii). 
 22 Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(iv). 
 23 Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(v). 
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quirement of a fundamental reform in governance.24  Several core 
indispensable features of a charter school serve to distinguish charter 
schools from traditional public schools.  State charter laws that deny 
autonomy and flexibility and do not grant adequate resources create 
charter schools that are materially indistinguishable from the tradi-
tional public school model.  Such rigid laws are inconsistent with the 
purpose and framework of NCLB’s restructuring provision and thus 
are impermissible options. 
An analysis of NCLB, focusing on its enactment and purpose, 
provides the background for this remedial legislation in the begin-
ning of Part II.  The NCLB discussion includes a close examination of 
two critical components of the law: AYP and restructuring.  Part II 
ends with a discussion of NCLB’s five restructuring options.  Part III 
analyzes the purpose and elements of a charter school and, in doing 
so, distinguishes charter schools from traditional public schools.  In 
the context of this discussion of NCLB and charter schools, Part IV 
fleshes out the charter-school option in light of NCLB’s goals.  This 
Comment identifies the irreducible elements of a charter school—
autonomy, flexibility, and adequate resources—and concludes that a 
charter-school framework that does not include these fundamental 
elements is inconsistent with NCLB’s purpose and goals and, as a re-
sult, is impermissible under the statute. 
II. NCLB: AN OVERVIEW 
A. The Education Reform Movement and NCLB’s Inception 
The promise of change resonated in President George W. Bush’s 
signature as he signed NCLB into law on January 8, 2002, and de-
clared the beginning of a “new era” in American public education.25  
The federal government enacted the law to “ensure that all children 
have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality 
education”26 and to promote high-performing schools, amidst a grow-
 24 Jennifer Hochschild, Rethinking Accountability Politics, in NO CHILD LEFT 
BEHIND?: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 108 (Paul E. Peter-
son & Martin R. West eds., 2003).  Note that “strong laws” are not laws that impose 
more rules, but just the opposite—laws that allow for greater flexibility. 
 25 Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, President Signs Land-
mark Education Bill (Jan. 8, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2002/01/20020108-1.html; see also Elisabeth Busmiller, Focusing on the 
Home Front, Bush Signs Education Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2002, at A1. 
 26 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. II 2002). 
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ing public awareness of the need to better educate America’s chil-
dren.27
To truly understand the significance of NCLB, it is necessary to 
examine the law in the context of a broader education reform effort.  
NCLB is the latest step in the reform movement, which seeks to en-
sure uniform and measurable school accountability.28  Released by 
the federal government in 1983, A Nation at Risk—the first step in the 
movement—reported the decreased competitiveness of American 
students in the international market and called for a diverse range of 
educational reforms in hopes of reversing the downward trend in 
American public education.29  This publication pushed the nation 
toward the idea of accountability, principally by raising educational 
issues higher on political agendas.30  More specifically, it introduced 
novel ideas and proposed basic reforms, such as the need for students 
to be given more challenging tasks, for teachers to be better trained 
and compensated, and for states to strengthen their commitment to 
quality education.31
As the education reform movement gained momentum, the fed-
eral government’s actions to ensure the successful improvement of 
the public education system intensified.  In 1994, Congress amended 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA)32 
through the passage of the Improving America’s Schools Act 
(IASA).33  The signature component of the ESEA, and thereafter the 
IASA, is Title I, the federal government’s single largest education aid 
program, aimed at helping disadvantaged students in kindergarten 
through twelfth grade.34  NCLB reauthorizes the IASA and the ESEA 
and further requires that school districts receiving Title I funding de-
 27 OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 6, at 1. 
 28 Danielle Holley-Walker, The Accountability Cycle: The Recovery School District Act 
and New Orleans’ Charter Schools, 40 CONN. L. REV. 125, 128–31 (2007). 
 29 NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR 
EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983), available at http://www.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/ 
index.html; see also CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
THE 108TH CONGRESS 307 (Edward H. Crane & David Boaz eds., 2003), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb108-29.pdf. 
 30 Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson, Introduction to NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND?: THE 
POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 6 (Paul E. Peterson & Martin R. 
West eds., 2003). 
 31 Id. 
 32 20 U.S.C.S. § 7801 (2000) (now included as part of the 2001 NCLB). 
 33 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. II 2002).  The IASA of 1994, Pub. L No. 103-382, 108 
Stat. 3618 (1994) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–7941 (2003)) was en-
acted on October 20, 1994, to reauthorize the ESEA. 
 34 Id. 
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velop coherent and rigorous academic standards and that all students 
attain proficiency within twelve years.35
NCLB represents a bipartisan compromise that increases the 
role of the federal government in education.36  Moreover, the legisla-
tion reflects the federal government’s commitment to equal educa-
tion for all children, regardless of race or socioeconomic status.37  Al-
though the law marks a distinguishable shift in the degree of federal 
power over education, scholars have debated the extent of the shift.  
One scholar described NCLB as a “step toward institutionalizing vari-
ous types of market-driven reforms” by requiring school districts to 
offer choice, provide access to supplemental services, and reform 
schools.38  Conversely, other academics have taken a more extreme 
position on the impact of NCLB, calling it a “massive shift” in federal 
power over education.39  Still others hail the law as particularly re-
markable in light of the U.S. Constitution’s silence on the federal 
government’s role in education.40
 35 Andrew Rudalevige, No Child Left Behind: Forging a Congressional Compromise, in 
NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND?: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 26 
(Paul E. Peterson & Martin R. West eds., 2003).  Curiously, NCLB does not define 
one level of proficiency that all students must attain within twelve years.  Rather, 
NCLB leaves it to individual states to determine what constitutes academic profi-
ciency.  BELLA ROSENBERG, WHAT’S PROFICIENT?: THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT AND 
THE MANY MEANINGS OF PROFICIENCY 2 (2004), http://www.aft.org/pubs-
reports/downloads/teachers/WhatsProficient.pdf.  Therefore, academic proficiency 
may vary greatly from state to state.  For a detailed discussion of proficiency, see id. 
 36 Busmiller, supra note 25, at A1. 
 37 Shavar D. Jeffries, The Structural Inadequacy of Public Schools for Stigmatized Minori-
ties: The Need for Institutional Remedies, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 38 (2006) (“NCLB is 
the culmination of [a] growing federal role, requiring states, among other things, to 
meet more rigorous academic standards, implement annual testing in specified 
grades, ensure schools employ ‘highly qualified’ teachers, and initiate federally de-
fined accountability regimes.”). 
 38 RHIM, supra note 1, at 7. 
 39 Thomas Rentschler, No Child Left Behind: Admirable Goals, Disastrous Outcomes, 
12 WIDENER L. REV. 637, 642 (2006).  Another journalist went so far as to assert that 
NCLB is the most important education plan since Brown v. Board of Education, which 
outlawed school segregation in 1954.  Other Opinion: Failure Flunking No Child Left Be-
hind, TIMES LEADER (Pa.), May 3, 2005, at A9. 
 40 Ralph D. Mawdsley & J. Joy Cumming, School District Accountability, Special Edu-
cation Students, and the Dilemma of High Stakes Testing: An Australia-United States Com-
parison, 188 EDUC. LAW REP., 2004, at 1, 2  (citing MICHAEL W. LAMORTE, SCHOOL LAW: 
CASES AND CONCEPTS 2–3 (2007)).  The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
has been historically construed as reserving the powers involving education to indi-
vidual states’ domain.  Id. 
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B. NCLB’s Driving Force Is Accountability 
The federal government passed NCLB with the promise to 
change the culture of the nation’s schools,41 to ensure a fair, equal, 
and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education for all 
children.42  The U.S. Department of Education highlights four pillars 
that sustain the ideals of NCLB: (1) accountability, (2) flexibility, (3) 
research-based education, and (4) parent options.43  Each of these 
pillars stems from NCLB’s underlying goal of creating high-
performing schools throughout the country.  However, the law’s cor-
nerstone pillar is the accountability provision, which builds upon the 
notion of rigorous academic content and high achievement stan-
dards.44
NCLB emphasizes accountability by requiring schools to meet 
state-specified standards, and the failure to meet these standards will 
result in sanctions.45  NCLB seeks to hold schools accountable if they 
are under-performing, or “failing,” by requiring states to measure 
student performance and to ensure that students attain proficiency in 
reading and math by the 2013–14 school year.46  Schools are rated ac-
cording to their AYP, a benchmark which requires a state-specified 
percentage of students to meet proficiency standards on assessment 
tests.47  To receive federal aid, every state must establish a set of stan-
dards and a comprehensive testing plan for measuring proficiency of 
those standards.48  NCLB requires that state educational agencies 
(SEAs) and local educational agencies (LEAs) annually review the 
status of every school to ensure that the school is reaching AYP.49
 41 WOLF DIBIASE, supra note 12, at 1. 
 42 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. II 2002). 
 43 U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Overview: Four Pillars of NCLB (July 1, 2004), 
http://www.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/4pillars.html. 
 44 OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 6, at 1. 
 45 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2). 
 46 Id. § 6311. 
 47 Id. § 6311(b)(2)(C) (Supp. II 2002). 
“Adequate yearly progress” shall be defined by the State in a matter 
that: (i) applies the same high standards of academic achievement to 
all public elementary school and secondary school students in the 
State; (ii) is statistically valid and reliable; (iii) results in continuous 
and substantial academic improvement for all students; (iv) measures 
the progress of public elementary schools, secondary schools, and  
local educational agencies and the State . . . ; (v) includes separate 
measurable annual objectives for continuous and substantial improve-
ment . . . . 
Id. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(i)–(v). 
 48 Id.  See generally West & Peterson, supra note 30, at 1–2. 
 49 OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 6, at 1. 
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Schools that continuously fail to meet AYP targets face increas-
ingly punitive measures.50  The yardstick of success is standardized 
testing.  Accountability is ultimately accomplished by the tabulation 
of test scores, which are used to determine whether schools are mak-
ing AYP toward full proficiency.51  Annual local and state district re-
port cards inform governmental agencies and parents about a 
school’s progress.52  Students at schools that fail to meet these stan-
dards may transfer to other schools in the same district and, if a 
school chronically fails to make adequate progress, the school is sub-
ject to escalating consequences, ultimately culminating in restructur-
ing.53
The unifying principles of the other three pillars—flexibility, re-
search-based education, and parent options—are access and choice.  
Parents with children attending low-performing schools have new op-
tions under NCLB.  For example, school districts must tell parents if 
their child is enrolled in a Title I school that has been identified for 
school improvement, corrective action, or restructuring.54  NCLB re-
quires that the LEA make a choice available for students by the first 
day of the school year following the school year in which the LEA 
administered the assessments that resulted in the school being 
deemed as in need of improvement.55  At a minimum, this notifica-
tion must inform parents that their child is eligible to attend another 
public school and identify each public school in the district that the 
parent can select.56  Moreover, NCLB grants parents access to free af-
ter-school tutoring if their child attends a school marked in need of 
improvement.57
C. Drastic Times Call for Drastic Measures: The Restructuring 
Provision of NCLB 
NCLB prescribes escalating stages of intervention to ensure that 
students at struggling schools are supplied with increasing amounts 
of assistance.58  After failing to make AYP for one year, the school is 
warned, but there is no formal sanction; rather, it is at this time that 
 50 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b). 
 51 Id. § 6311. 
 52 OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 6, at 1. 
 53 Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. §6316 (b)(8)(B) (Supp. II 2002). 
 54 34 C.F.R. § 200.36(b)(4) (2007). 
 55 OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 6, at A-1. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at B-6, E-4. 
 58 Id. 
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the AYP clock starts ticking.  After another year of failing to make 
AYP, the school is identified for “school improvement.”59  At this 
stage, the school must offer students the choice to attend an AYP-
satisfying school.60  If a school fails to make AYP for three consecutive 
years,61 the school district must continue to provide the students with 
the option to transfer to another public school.62
During the initial three years of a school failing to make AYP, 
the sanctions imposed symbolize the theme of change.  For example, 
school districts may contract out with private organizations to provide 
supplemental educational services to increase academic enrichment 
for students attending schools in need of improvement.63  Allowing 
school districts and parents to choose private providers for services, 
such as tutoring, symbolizes a level of fundamental change in the 
school’s structure, which is traditionally controlled by the public sec-
tor.  In effect, this choice places pressure on the school and other 
public providers to improve.64
After failing to make AYP for four consecutive years, the school 
district must continue to offer the choice to transfer and a range of 
supplemental services, but it must also implement “corrective ac-
tions.”65  Corrective actions “substantially and directly” respond to the 
“consistent academic failure of a school.”66  They are “significant in-
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at B-6. 
 61 The labels designated to schools after each year of failing to make AYP can be 
rather confusing.  Since a formal label is not placed on the school after one year of 
failing to make AYP, this year can be thought of as the “Warning Year.”  It is not until 
two consecutive years of failing to make AYP that a school is designated as being in 
“School Improvement Year 1.”  Therefore, a school that fails to make AYP for three 
consecutive years is actually in “School Improvement Year 2.”  See generally OFFICE OF 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 6, at B-1–H-1. 
 62 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(5) (Supp. II 2002). 
 63 OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., SUPPLEMENTAL EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICES: NON-REGULATORY GUIDANCE A-1 (2005), available at http://www.ed.gov/ 
policy/elsec/guid/suppsvcsguid.doc. “Supplemental educational services must be 
provided outside of the regular school day.  Supplemental educational services must 
be high quality, research-based, and specifically designed to increase student aca-
demic achievement.”  Id. 
 64 The downstream effect of choice is a highly contested question that is beyond 
the scope of this Comment, but must be acknowledged.  See, e.g., JULIAN R. BETTS ET 
AL., DOES SCHOOL CHOICE WORK? EFFECTS ON STUDENT INTEGRATION AND ACHIEVEMENT 
3–4 (2006), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_806JBR.pdf; 
JULIE BERRY CULLEN ET AL., THE EFFECT OF SCHOOL CHOICE ON STUDENT OUTCOMES: 
EVIDENCE FROM RANDOMIZED LOTTERIES (2003), available at http://ideas.repec.org/ 
p/nbr/nberwo/10113.html. 
 65 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(7). 
 66 Id. 
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tervention[s]”67 designed to correct the school’s chronic failure to 
make AYP.68  Identifying a school for corrective action indicates the 
LEA’s intention to take greater control of the school’s governance 
and to have a more hands-on approach to the school’s decision-
making processes.  Moreover, this label signals that the initial ap-
proaches to school improvement have been unsuccessful and that 
more extreme action is necessary to bolster learning conditions and 
progress.69
If “school improvement” and “corrective action” interventions 
prove unsuccessful, the school finally meets the fate of restructuring, 
a fundamental governance reform.70  School restructuring is a two-
step process.  The first step begins after a school fails to make AYP for 
five consecutive years.71  At that time, the school must develop a plan 
for restructuring.72  After failing to make AYP for six consecutive 
years, the school enters the second step and must implement the re-
structuring plan.73  Generally, when a school is in restructuring status, 
the LEA must make crucial and substantive efforts to overhaul the 
governance of that school.74
NCLB permits five options for school restructuring: 
(i) Reopening the school as a public charter school. 
(ii) Replacing all or most of the school staff (which may include 
the principal) who are relevant to the failure to make ade-
quate yearly progress. 
(iii) Entering into a contract with an entity, such as a private 
management company, with a demonstrated record of effec-
tiveness, to operate the public school. 
(iv) Turning the operation of the school over to the State educa-
tional agency, if permitted under State law and agreed to by 
the State. 
(v) Any other major restructuring of the school’s governance 
arrangement that makes fundamental reforms, such as sig-
nificant changes in the school’s staffing and governance, to 
improve student academic achievement in the school and 
that has substantial promise of enabling the school to make 
 67 OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 6, at F-1. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 21. 
 70 Id. at 5. 
 71 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(A) (Supp. II 2002). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B). 
 74 OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 6, at G-1. 
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adequate yearly progress . . . .75
Federal regulations explain the kind of restructuring contem-
plated by NCLB.  These rules define restructuring as a “major reor-
ganization of a school’s governance arrangement” by a LEA that: “(1) 
makes fundamental reforms . . . to improve student academic 
achievement in the school; (2) has substantial promise of enabling 
the school to make AYP . . . ; and (3) is consistent with State law.”76
NCLB’s restructuring provision unambiguously requires funda-
mental reforms in school governance.  The concept of fundamental 
reform is even more apparent when the restructuring option is 
viewed in the context of its precipitating sanctions of “school im-
provement” and “corrective action.”  To demonstrate just how perva-
sively this theme is woven into each of the five options, it is vital to 
briefly analyze each option.  Option (i) permits the school to close 
and reopen as a charter school.77   
Option (ii), the turnaround option,78 imposes fundamental 
change by requiring schools to replace staff who are responsible for 
the school’s failure, including the principal.79  While entire staff re-
placement is a viable route under this option, research indicates that 
many of these schools are “turned around” by merely replacing the 
principal or members of the administration.80  Often, there will not 
be substantial teacher replacement in these schools.  For that reason, 
turnaround is a common option for satisfying NCLB’s restructuring 
provision because it only has a minimal impact on the teachers re-
maining in a restructured school.81  Nevertheless, this option consti-
tutes a fundamental reform because it literally changes the composi-
tion of the governing body at the school. 
Option (iii), the contracting option, requires fundamental gov-
ernance change by compelling a school to contract out to a private or 
non-profit organization.82  The school district closes the school and 
 75 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B). 
 76 34 C.F.R. § 200.43 (2007). 
 77 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(i) (Supp. II 2002).  Since this option is the crux of 
the present Comment, it will be further analyzed in Parts III and IV. 
 78 CTR. FOR COMPREHENSIVE SCH. REFORM AND IMPROVEMENT, SCHOOL 
RESTRUCTURING UNDER NCLB: WHAT WORKS WHEN? A GUIDE FOR EDUCATION LEADERS 
3 (2006).  Some scholars have referred to this option as the “reconstitution” option.  
E.g., BETTY MALEN ET AL., RECONSTITUTING SCHOOLS: “TESTING” THE “THEORY OF 
ACTION” 113–32 (2002). 
 79 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(ii). 
 80 CTR. FOR COMPREHENSIVE SCH. REFORM AND IMPROVEMENT, supra note 78, at 43. 
 81 Id. 
 82 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(iii). 
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reopens it as a school managed by an outside governing unit with a 
well-established record of success, such as an education management 
organization (EMO).83  The school district selects the EMO to man-
age the school and monitors the EMO’s performance.84  The district 
retains some level of control because it can rescind the contract if 
student achievement does not improve.85  This option represents a 
substantial reform because it involves an entirely innovative govern-
ance model.  American education institutions have historically been 
public enterprises.86  Therefore, contracting out a public enterprise 
(i.e., a traditional public school) to a private entity is a radically novel 
alternative. 
Option (iv), known as a state takeover, also requires fundamen-
tal change by turning the school operations over to the SEA.87  There 
are compelling reasons why an LEA would command a state takeover.  
The LEA might invite such action when the district is unable to gov-
ern the restructuring decision process for all of the failing schools in 
its district.88  A district may adopt this option if it does not have the 
capability to manage the implementation of restructuring in each in-
dividual school, because such oversight is logistically impossible.89  
Analogous to the other restructuring options, this option represents a 
significant reform because of the longstanding tradition of local edu-
cational control in our society. 
Finally, option (v) permits the school to restructure by choosing 
another form of major restructuring.90  The statutory provision ex-
plicitly requires fundamental reforms in governance with “substantial 
promise” of allowing the school to make AYP.91  Although the law 
does not specify how this option can be implemented, proposed ex-
amples include significant changes to accommodate the needs of a 
small sub-group of under-achieving students, such as creating smaller 
learning communities.92  This restructuring option may also be help-
 83 CTR. FOR COMPREHENSIVE SCH. REFORM AND IMPROVEMENT, supra note 78, at 7. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 William Haft, Charter Schools and the Nineteen Century Corporation: A Match Made 
in the Public Interest, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1023, 1024 (1998). 
 87 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(iv) (Supp. II 2002). 
 88 CTR. FOR COMPREHENSIVE SCH. REFORM AND IMPROVEMENT, supra note 78, at 19. 
 89 Id. 
 90 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(v).  The broad, and somewhat ambiguous, lan-
guage of option (v) indicates that this option is really a catch-all, encompassing the 
scope and essence of the restructuring provision.  The four preceding options are 
examples of how the catch-all may be practically implemented. 
 91 Id. 
 92 CTR. FOR COMPREHENSIVE SCH. REFORM AND IMPROVEMENT, supra note 78, at 8. 
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ful for schools in which a new leader has been hired and, while the 
school continues to fail to make AYP, the new leader has achieved 
some improvements, albeit not a satisfactory turnaround.93  In this in-
stance, there is the expectation that with training and support, the 
new leader can become a “turnaround” leader.94
D. America’s Public Schools Are “Restructuring” 
In the aftermath of NCLB’s passage, SEAs and LEAs face the 
daunting task of ensuring academic achievement and progress.  Since 
many schools are now in the restructuring phase, or rapidly ap-
proaching this point, an analysis of the restructuring provision is both 
a relevant and important discussion.  However, NCLB gives very little 
guidance on how restructuring should be implemented,95 notwith-
standing its palpable effect. 
In the 2005–06 school year, approximately six hundred schools 
in the nation were in the restructuring phase.96  Since many more 
schools will meet this fate in the upcoming years, school restructuring 
will have significant consequences, not just for state and national 
leaders, but for communities across the nation.97  Statistical projec-
tions estimate that nearly 2000 schools will be in restructuring in the 
2007–08 school year and 3200 schools in the 2008–09 school year.98  
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Congress left to the states the standards to be set, the design of testing instru-
ments, and the administration of accountability systems.  West & Peterson, supra note 
30, at 8–9.  As a result, states differ in their methods of creating and implementing 
standardized tests. 
 96 Bryan C. Hassel, Emily Ayscue Hassel & Lauren Morando Rhim, Introduction: 
Overview of Restructuring, in HANDBOOK ON RESTRUCTURING AND SUBSTANTIAL SCHOOL 
IMPROVEMENT 9, 10 (Herbert J. Walberg ed., 2007) (citing National Center for Educa-
tion Statistics, Participation in Education (Washington D.C., 2005)), available at 
http://www.centerii.org/survey/downloads/Restructuring%20Handbook.pdf.  This 
is not even an accurate representation of low-performing schools, since most states 
have not been tracking AYP long enough for schools to enter restructuring.  Id. 
 97 See, e.g., RON BRADY, CAN FAILING SCHOOLS BE FIXED? 28–31 (2003), available at 
http://www.edexcellence.net/doc/failing_schools.pdf. 
 98 Hassel et al., supra note 96, at 10 (citing Center on Education Policy, From the 
Capital to the Classroom: Year Four of the No Child Left Behind Act (Washington D.C., 
2006)).  Current periodicals also emphasize the growing number of schools in re-
structuring.  See, e.g., Diana Jean Schemo, Bush Proposes Broadening the No Child Left 
Behind Act, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2007, at A1 (“[T]here were currently about 1,800 of 
these schools across the country, where students have failed to meet state targets for 
reading and math for more than five years.”). 
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Restructuring has been largely an urban phenomenon.99  In the 
2005–06 school year, approximately ninety percent of schools in re-
structuring were located in urban districts.100  Moreover, the restruc-
turing in fifteen school districts accounted for nearly one-half of all 
schools in restructuring.101
Although NCLB delineates five options for restructuring, the 
precise courses of action are omitted from the statute’s text.102  Con-
sequently, specific approaches to each of the restructuring options 
vary widely among the states.103  Most states have opted for a hands-off 
approach, attained through option (v).104  The Government Account-
ability Office reported that forty percent of schools facing restructur-
ing selected option (v), thereby making “other” changes, such as cre-
ating smaller learning communities.105  However, such minor steps 
toward restructuring are incompatible with the goal of NCLB’s re-
structuring provision, which explicitly requires fundamental re-
form.106  The federal government intended for the restructuring pro-
vision to serve as a last resort, only after the school has failed to meet 
AYP for several consecutive years and the preceding penalties have 
proven unsuccessful.107  SEAs and LEAs that “restructure” by merely 
creating smaller learning communities, replacing a few teachers, or 
changing textbook publishers are not adhering to the requirement of 
fundamental reform.  Each state has a legal responsibility to ensure 
compliance with the federal mandate of a fundamental reform.108
 99 Julie Kowal & Bryan C. Hassel, Remedies in Action: Four “Restructured” Schools, in 
NO REMEDY LEFT BEHIND: LESSONS FROM A HALF-DECADE OF NCLB 267, 269 (Frederick 
M. Hess & Chester E. Finn Jr. eds., 2007). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B) (Supp. II 2002). 
 103 WOLF DIBIASE, supra note 12, at 3. 
 104 Id. 
 105 David J. Hoff, Some Schools Take No Restructuring Action, GAO Finds, EDUC. WK., 
Sept. 12, 2007, at 21.  Although option (v) has been interpreted as a laissez-faire ap-
proach, this Comment contends that Congress actually intended for that option to 
be just as drastic a measure as the other four options in the restructuring provision. 
 106 See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b). 
 107 WOLF DIBIASE, supra note 12, at 3. 
 108 This Comment seeks to analyze and interpret the restructuring provision itself, 
and demonstrate how individual state laws either promote or inhibit successful re-
structuring.  The ongoing and contentious debate about assessing academic 
achievement and methods for accountability is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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III. CHARTER SCHOOLS: ALTERNATIVES TO THE TRADITIONAL  
PUBLIC SCHOOL FRAMEWORK 
A. What Is a Charter School? 
Charter schools are “legally and fiscally”109 autonomous public 
schools operated under a charter granted by a state’s government.110  
A charter school’s grant may be authorized by various entities.  De-
pending on state laws, charter school authorizers may include state 
education boards, universities, and most commonly, local school dis-
tricts.111  The founding charter is a legal agreement between the au-
thorizer and the school’s governing body, which describes the 
school’s management, goals, and autonomy.112  Typically, charter 
schools are founded and established by educators, community 
groups, or private organizations that function under a contract, gen-
erally for three to five years.113  The majority of charter schools in the 
United States are new schools starting from scratch, while the “close-
and-reopen” option—whereby a traditional public school closes and 
reopens as a charter school (as would be the case with NCLB restruc-
turing)—is less common.114
The steady growth of the charter school movement has garnered 
national, albeit controversial, attention.  Currently, forty states and 
 109 Vergari, supra note 5, at 2. 
 110 CHESTER E. FINN, BRUNO V. MANNO & GREGG VANOUREK, CHARTER SCHOOLS IN 
ACTION: RENEWING PUBLIC EDUCATION 14–15 (2000).  The charter school movement 
was created in the midst of stagnant results in education and rose to prominence 
with the backing of two powerful reform movements, the accountability and choice 
movements.  Tom Loveless, Charter School Achievement and Accountability, in NO CHILD 
LEFT BEHIND?: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 177, 177–78 
(Paul E. Peterson & Martin R. West eds., 2003).  The charter school movement be-
gan in 1991, when Minnesota passed the first charter school law, with California fol-
lowing suit in 1992.  U.S. Charter Schools, History of Charter Schools, http://www. 
uscharterschools.org/pub/uscs_docs/o/history.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2008).  By 
1995, nineteen states enacted charter laws, and by 2003, the number of states with 
charter laws expanded to forty.  Id.  The federal government has authenticated char-
ter schools since the inception of the Public Charter Schools Program in 1994.  Ver-
gari, supra note 5, at 1. 
 111 Paul A. Herdman, Nelson Smith & Cynthia Skinner, Charter Schools and the New 
Federal Accountability Provisions, EDUC. PERFORMANCE NETWORK POL’Y BRIEF, Mar. 2002, 
at 5. 
 112 MATTHEW D. ARKIN & JULIE M. KOWAL, REOPENING AS A CHARTER SCHOOL 4 
(2005), available at http://www.centerforcsri.org/pubs/restructuring/Knowledge 
Issues2Chartering.pdf. 
 113 TODD M. ZIEBARTH, CLOSING LOW-PERFORMING SCHOOLS AND REOPENING THEM 
AS CHARTER SCHOOLS: THE ROLE OF THE STATE 1 (2004). 
 114 ARKIN & KOWAL, supra note 112, at 5. 
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the District of Columbia have charter school laws.115  Moreover, there 
are an estimated 4303 charter schools throughout the country, and 
1,259,571 students attending such schools.116  For the 2008–09 school 
year, 355 new charter schools opened nationwide.117
Statistics, however, do not truly capture the essence of what it 
means to be a charter school.  In order to understand the phenome-
non and its implications, a proper examination explores how charter 
schools differ from traditional public schools.  First and foremost, 
charter schools are independent from the school district and are 
given a higher degree of autonomy in managing the school in ex-
change for a greater degree of accountability.118  A major reason of-
ten cited for the rapid expansion of the charter school movement is 
the privilege to be “exempt from burdensome, stifling, innovation 
killing features” of the traditional public school model.119  The char-
ter school concept has been depicted as an understated but powerful 
method of offering innovative choice in public education without the 
characteristic micromanagement of government bureaucracies.120  
Charter schools share certain qualities of traditional public schools in 
that they receive government funding and cannot charge tuition.121  
However, charter schools are exempt from many state restrictions 
 115 NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., GROWTH AND QUALITY IN THE CHARTER 
SCHOOL MOVEMENT: 2008 DASHBOARD 1 (2008), http://www.publiccharters.org/files/ 
publications/Charter_Dashboard_2008.pdf. 
 116  Id.  The Center for Education Reform reports slightly different statistics for the 
2008–09 school year: 4568 charter schools, and 1,341,687 students in charter schools.  
Ctr. for Educ. Reform, National Charter School Data: 2008–2009 New School Estimates, 
http://www.edreform.com/_upload/CER_charter_numbers.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 
2008). 
 117 Ctr. for Educ. Reform, All About Charter Schools, http://www.edreform.com/ 
index.cfm?fuseAction=document&documentID=1964 (last visited Dec. 28, 2008).  
 118 Robin D. Barnes, Group Conflict and the Constitution: Race, Sexuality, and Religion: 
Black America and School Choice: Charting a New Course, 106 YALE L.J. 2375, 2380 (1997) 
(citing National Survey and Analysis of Charter School Legislation: A Report to the 
Citizens of the State of Connecticut I-1 (Institute for Responsive Education Report 
1996)). 
 119 Robert J. Martin, Rigid Rules for Charter Schools: New Jersey as a Case Study, 36 
RUTGERS L.J. 439, 442 (2005) (citing SEYMOUR B. SARASON, CHARTER SCHOOLS: 
ANOTHER FLAWED EDUCATION REFORM? vii (1998)). 
 120 Id. (citing Bruno V. Mano, How Charter Schools are Different: Lessons and Implica-
tions from a National Study, 79 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 488 (1998)). 
 121 Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, III, Charter Schools Under the NLCB: 
Choice and Equal Educational Opportunity, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 165, 177–78 
(2007) (citing Aaron Jay Saiger, The Last Wave: The Rise of the Contingent School District, 
84 N.C. L. REV. 857, 881 (2006) (commenting that charter schools are public because 
they “receive only public funds, and may not require tuition”)). 
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and regulations in exchange for a promise to fulfill the educational 
mission enumerated in the charter grant.122
Pursuant to federal law, the government has developed a defini-
tion that charter schools must satisfy in order to qualify for federal 
funding.123  Salient features of the charter school definition limit the 
term to public schools with certain qualities.  For example, charter 
schools are “exempt from significant State or local rules that inhibit 
the flexible operation and management of public schools.”124  The 
school must be nonsectarian in its programs, admission policies, and 
employment practices and not affiliated with a religious institution.125  
Furthermore, the school is voluntary, may not charge tuition, and 
admits students on a lottery basis if more students apply for admission 
than can be accommodated.126
The evolution of federal charter school legislation began with 
the IASA of 1994.127  The IASA was adopted two years after Minnesota 
enacted the first charter school law and at a time when very few other 
states had such legislation.128  Congress subsequently amended the 
federal legislation through the Charter School Expansion Act of 
1998.129  Congress again amended the legislation as part of NCLB, 
which provided further funding opportunities for charter schools by 
enacting the Innovative Programs and the Public Charter Schools 
Program for the design and implementation of charter schools.130
B. Charter Schools Are Laboratories for Reform131
The charter school movement is an ideal avenue for incubating 
change within the American public education system.132  As previously 
 122 Id. 
 123 See Strengthening and Improvement of Elementary and Secondary Schools 
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 8061 (2000)), re-
pealed by No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codi-
fied at 20 U.S.C. §§ 7221–7225g (2000)). 
 124 20 U.S.C. § 7221i(1)(A) (2000). 
 125 Id. § 7221i(1)(E). 
 126 Id. § 7221i(1)(F), (H). 
 127 Id. § 8061. 
 128 Martin, supra note 119, at 525 n.82. 
 129 Pub. L. No. 105-278, 112 Stat. 2682 (1998).  “The thrust of this act was to elicit 
more funding for and to impose greater accountability on charter schools.”  Martin, 
supra note 119, at 458. 
 130 Martin, supra note 119, at 458. (citing Pub. L. No 107-770, 115 Stat. 1425 
(2002)). 
 131 Molly O’Brien, Education and the Constitution: Shaping Each Other and the Next 
Century: Free at Last? Charter Schools and the “Deregulated” Curriculum, 34 AKRON L. REV. 
137, 139 (2000). 
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mentioned, the majority of the schools currently in NCLB restructur-
ing are located in low-income, minority school districts.133  Nationally, 
“charter schools serve a larger proportion of minority and low-
income students.”134  For example, in the 2004–05 school year, fifty-
eight percent of charter school students belonged to a minority racial 
or ethnic group.135  Even more startling, fifty-four percent of charter 
school students were eligible for free or reduced-price lunch,136 and 
“charter schools are three times as likely to be located in big-city 
school districts as are traditional public schools.”137  The fact that 
schools in NCLB restructuring and charter schools serve a similar 
population naturally leads to the proposition that the two can work 
hand-in-hand. 
Charter school proponents embrace the concept of school 
choice as a way to increase competition among schools and offer 
necessary alternatives to “deteriorating, badly managed, and obsolete 
educational programs.”138  Not only do charter schools serve the stu-
dents within their school buildings, but they promote healthy compe-
tition by prompting the improvement of traditional public schools.  
Traditional public schools must improve or risk losing students and 
the funding attached to them.139  Of course, charter schools are not 
the only solution for incubating educational reform.  However, be-
cause they have demonstrated growing success in advancing academic 
achievement among low-performing, disadvantaged students, and be-
cause they encourage flexibility, charter schools logically should be at 
the strategic forefront.140
 132 Victoria J. Dodd, American Public Education and Change: Not an Oxymoron, 17 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 109, 120 (1997). 
 133 Kowal & Hassel, supra note 99, at 269. 
 134 ARKIN & KOWAL, supra note 112, at 5. 
 135 HOPES, FEARS AND REALITY: A BALANCED LOOK AT AMERICAN CHARTER SCHOOLS IN 
2005 15 (Robin J. Lake & Paul T. Hill eds., 2005), available at http://eric.ed.gov/ 
ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/27/ff/72.pdf. 
 136 ALISON CONSOLETTI & JEANNE ALLEN, 2007 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICA’S 
CHARTER SCHOOLS 3, 10 (2007).   Moreover, charter schools “target services to stu-
dents at both ends of the instructional spectrum who are being failed by the ‘one-
size-fits-all’ educational system: teen parents, special education students, adjudicated 
youth, English language learners.”  Id. 
 137 ARKIN & KOWAL, supra note 112, at 6. 
 138 Barnes, supra note 118, at 2380. 
 139 Although beyond the scope of this Comment, the robust debate about the ef-
fects of choice on traditional public school systems, particularly whether public 
schools are in fact induced to improve because of the success of charter schools, 
should be acknowledged.  See, e.g., BETTS ET AL., supra note 64, at 3–4. 
 140 NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., CREATING THE SCHOOLS OUR NATION 
NEEDS: NCLB REAUTHORIZATION AND THE PROMISE OF PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS 1 
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The most unique characteristic of a charter school is that its con-
tinued existence is tied to its performance.141  Unlike a traditional 
public school, the threat of being closed down constantly looms over 
a charter school.  As noted earlier, the charter school movement 
stemmed from an era where accountability and choice were pervasive 
themes in education.142  However, a potential conflict exists between 
these dueling themes.  A requisite element of choice is that the 
school is free to create its own goals and to govern itself independ-
ently.143  On the other hand, accountability systems impede upon the 
concepts of choice and freedom—defining benchmarks for achieve-
ment reduces the autonomy of charter schools.144  In turn, charter 
schools with below-level test scores are in jeopardy of closing down, 
even if parents choose to send their children to these “autonomous” 
schools.145
IV. HARMONIZING NCLB AND CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS: 
CAN THE TWO JOIN TOGETHER TO FORM A UNITED FRONT? 
An analysis of charter schools must begin with a simple truth: 
not all charter laws are created equal.  An obvious yet often over-
looked attribute of charter schools is that they are creatures of state 
law and, therefore, the level of autonomy varies significantly from 
state to state.146  The strength of a charter school law directly bears 
upon the “quantity and viability” of charter schools.147  Expanding 
upon this issue is another fact: NCLB’s restructuring provision re-
quires fundamental change in a school’s governance.  Naturally, state 
(2007), available at http://www.publiccharters.org/files/publications/file_NAPCS_ 
NCLB_Statement_Singles_for_Web_1_.pdf.  Under NCLB, chartering need not be 
the first alternative to improving a school, but rather the last option after a school 
has passed through the phases of “school improvement” and “corrective action.”  See 
Hassel et al., supra note 96, at 10. 
 141 Barnes, supra note 118, at 2407. 
 142 Loveless, supra note 110, at 177. 
 143 Id. at 192. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 ARKIN & KOWAL, supra note 112, at 4. 
 147 Martin, supra note 119, at 510 (quoting Ctr. for Educ. Reform, Charter School 
Laws Across the States: Ranking and Scorecard, at iv–vi, tbl. 1 (8th ed. 2004)).  Note that 
“strong laws” are not laws that impose more rules, but just the opposite—laws that 
allow for greater flexibility.  Id. at 511.  The notions of quantity and viability will be 
fleshed out in the upcoming section, but a basic understanding is necessary.  Both 
terms denote the level and range of capability granted under state law.  Quantity re-
fers to the number of charter schools permitted under state law.  Viability refers to 
the charter school’s freedom to institute an innovative structure while simultaneously 
adhering to the state law’s regulations and guidelines. 
GOTTLIEB (FINAL) 1/26/2009  12:36:46 PM 
210 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:191 
 
charter laws that do not allow for fundamental change are incom-
patible with the federal law. 
Many states have promulgated rules on the extent to which char-
ter conversion is a permissible restructuring option under NCLB.148  
These practices fall into three categories: (1) states permitting char-
ter conversions; (2) states disallowing them; or (3) states that are si-
lent on chartering options.149  The relationship between state laws 
and NCLB’s restructuring options that radically alter a school’s gov-
ernance structure are examined in the forthcoming sub-sections. 
A. “Going Charter” Under NCLB Should Symbolize the Opportunity to 
Start Fresh 
In theory, chartering under NCLB allows a public school to re-
open with a “clean slate.”150  The framework gives the school greater 
flexibility than the traditional public school model.  When a school 
starts fresh, it has the freedom to “build [its] culture, routines, and 
systems from the ground up” and “an opportunity to develop from 
the start the kind of coherence that is a hallmark of effective 
schools.”151  However, starting fresh is unlikely to be successful unless 
state lawmakers develop sound and adaptable systems to implement 
it.152
In reality, charter schools often are not afforded a truly clean 
slate.  Many charter laws bog down conversion charters with excessive 
baggage.153  As a result, these laws either provide disincentives for 
schools to convert or they undermine the flexibility essential for a 
charter school to succeed as a restructured school.  The effect is that, 
in many states, a charter school’s “institutional design is not all that 
different from traditional public schools.”154  If the purpose of re-
structuring is to provide “a fresh start, a blank slate, a New Deal,” 
then this end is not achieved by rigid state laws.155  Rather, the result 
 148 TODD ZIEBARTH, ECS STATENOTES ACCOUNTABILITY: STATE POLICIES FOR SCHOOL 
RESTRUCTURING 1 (2004), available at http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/57/02/ 
5702.pdf. 
 149 See id. at 5. 
 150 ARKIN & KOWAL, supra note 112, at 5. 
 151 BRYAN C. HASSEL & LUCY STEINER, STARTING FRESH: A NEW STRATEGY FOR 
RESPONDING TO CHRONICALLY LOW PERFORMING SCHOOLS 3 (2003), available at 
http://www.publicimpact.com/high-stakes/startingfresh.pdf. 
 152 Id. at 5. 
 153 Nelson Smith, Charters as a Solution? So Far, States and Districts Have Opted for 
Anything But, EDUC. NEXT, Winter 2007, at 59. 
 154 Jeffries, supra note 37, at 63. 
 155 Smith, supra note 153, at 59. 
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is that the conversion charter school is structurally indistinguishable 
from the traditional public school. 
Simply labeling a school a “charter” could not have been what 
Congress intended when including chartering as a restructuring op-
tion under NCLB.  A mere “charter” label is certainly not a step in 
the direction toward fundamental reform intended by NCLB’s re-
structuring provision.  To the contrary, each restructuring option re-
quires a substantial reorganization of a school’s governance that will 
enable the school to make AYP.156  The chartering option is no differ-
ent—the restructured school, that is the newly created charter school, 
must be fundamentally different than the original school that failed 
to meet AYP for six consecutive years.  Thus, a charter conversion 
that does not yield such a reform in governance is impermissible un-
der NCLB. 
B. Conditions for Success: Autonomy, Flexibility, and Adequate 
Resources 
Based on this analysis of individual state charter laws, this Com-
ment proposes three indispensable characteristics of the kind of 
charter law contemplated by NCLB’s restructuring provision: (1) 
autonomy, (2) flexibility, and (3) adequate resources.  Charter laws 
that do not contain these characteristics result in schools that are ma-
terially indistinguishable from traditional public schools and thus in-
consistent with NCLB’s goal of fundamental reform.  Since these 
three elements are abstract concepts, this Comment also outlines 
concrete examples of each element. 
1. Autonomy 
Autonomy is an indispensable characteristic of a strong charter 
school law, because it gives charter schools the ability to make inde-
pendent decisions regarding structure and governance, free from bu-
reaucratic constraints.157  Concrete examples of autonomy in charter 
school laws include sovereignty to plan curriculum and freedom from 
collective bargaining agreements. 
 156 34 C.F.R. § 200.43 (2007). 
 157 William Haft, Charter Schools and the Nineteenth Century Corporation: A Match Made 
in the Public Interest, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1023, 1058 (1998) (citing Chester Finn et al., 
Charter Schools in Action: Final Report, Part III, at 2 (1997) (“Under a strong law, the 
state’s charter schools are essentially self-governing . . . .  They are accountable for 
their results but free to produce those results as they see fit.”)). 
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The first example of autonomy in a charter law is the freedom to 
design an innovative curriculum.158  One of the benefits of converting 
a traditional public school to a charter school is the ability to create a 
new curriculum and pedagogy that will trigger higher levels of stu-
dent learning.159  State rules that preclude such innovation under-
mine the innovative benefits of charter schools.  Since charter schools 
are governed under the public school system, there is often a set of 
standards in place for developing the curriculum.  However, charter 
schools should be granted greater autonomy in their opportunity to 
build upon these existing standards.  Creating a unique and challeng-
ing curriculum is vital to the construction of a successful charter 
school.160  Some state charter laws micromanage curriculum planning 
and these restrictions prevent the autonomy necessary for creative 
teaching and innovative learning. 
Another example of autonomy necessary for charter schools to 
succeed in light of NCLB’s restructuring provision is freedom from 
collective bargaining agreements.  Collective bargaining agreements 
spell out the “terms and conditions of principal and teacher em-
ployment and thus greatly restrict the capacity of local administrators 
to manage schools effectively.”161  Such agreements may dictate con-
ditions such as the length of the school year and school day, as well as 
hiring criteria.162  Collective bargaining agreements are especially ex-
hausting for charter schools, which seek to function as autonomous 
governing entities.  For example, teachers in Rhode Island are re-
quired to be part of the district’s bargaining unit and are subject to 
the district’s employment terms and conditions, causing strain be-
tween some charter school principals and teachers.163
Freeing charter schools from collective bargaining agreements 
does not mean that charter school staff should not have the opportu-
nity to bargain as a unit.  Rather, such autonomy allows charter 
school staff to tailor agreements in a way that will best suit the unique 
needs of the school.  Some charter laws bind teachers in conversion 
charter schools to collective bargaining agreements, whereas teachers 
 158 CONSOLETTI & ALLEN, supra note 136, at 11. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 1, 11. 
 161 Jeffries, supra note 37, at 43. 
 162 Id. 
 163 CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, THE SIMPLE GUIDE TO CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS: A 
PROGRESS REPORT 24 (Jeanne Allen & Anna Varghese Marcucio eds., 2005), available 
at http://www.edreform.com/upload/simpleguide.pdf. 
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in start-up charter schools are granted more leeway.164  For example, 
teachers in New Jersey charter conversion schools are bound by col-
lective bargaining agreements, but teachers in start-up charter 
schools have the option to be bound or to negotiate as a separate 
unit.165  This distinction results in charter conversions being more en-
tangled in the issues concerning traditional public schools, since both 
are under the same bargaining units.  For instance, the length of the 
school day is governed by the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment.166  Many charter schools find it necessary to have a longer 
school day to meet the needs of the students.167  Under a state charter 
law, such as New Jersey’s, the charter school cannot make the school 
day any longer than what has been bargained for by the teacher’s un-
ion. 
2. Flexibility 
The second irreducible element of a strong charter school stat-
ute is flexibility, which, akin to autonomy, grants charter schools the 
sovereignty necessary to ensure success.  Since charter schools often 
attract minority students who achieved at relatively low levels in a tra-
ditional public school, charter schools need flexibility to guarantee 
these students’ success in an innovative school model.168  This flexibil-
ity allows the charter school to respond to the unique circumstances 
and needs of its students.169  Tangible examples of flexibility include: 
longer charter grants, flexible timetables, elimination of the cap on 
the number of charters granted, more streamlined and efficient au-
thorization of charter schools, and the ability to bypass case-by-case 
granting of waivers from regulation. 
The first example of flexibility in a charter law is longer charter 
grants.  Charter schools are established through limited-term con-
tracts must be renewed at the end of the contract period.170  In thirty-
 164 See generally ECS STATENOTES, STATE COMPARISONS—STATE POLICIES FOR 
CHARTER SCHOOLS (2007), http://mb2.ecs.org/reports/Report.aspx?id=113 (last vis-
ited Sept. 6, 2008). 
 165 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-14 (2007); ECS STATENOTES, supra note 164. 
 166 See generally Jeffries, supra note 37, at 43. 
 167 CONSOLETTI & ALLEN, supra note 136, at 12. 
 168 In contrast to traditional public schools, charter schools encounter serious 
challenges to their survival.  One study reported that eleven percent of charter 
schools nationwide have closed, although the reasons for closure vary greatly (e.g., 
academic, financial, managerial).  CONSOLETTI & ALLEN, supra note 136, at 5. 
 169 FINN ET AL., supra note 110, at 14–15. 
 170 OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, DEP’T OF EDUC., THE STATE OF CHARTER 
SCHOOLS: FOURTH YEAR REPORT 12 (2000), available at 
http://www.ed.gov/pubs/charter4thyear/. 
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one states, charter grants range between three and five years in dura-
tion.171  Arizona and the District of Columbia, both ranked as having 
“strong” charter laws, have the longest charter terms of all the states 
with fifteen years.172  Longer charter grants are useful, if not essential, 
to a charter school’s success because the grants give incentive for 
charter school founders to invest time and resources in forming a 
charter school.173  Furthermore, extended charter grants give a char-
ter school the opportunity to mold itself to the students’ needs as 
time progresses.  Since many charter schools serve low-performing 
students, the school may need time to ensure long-term success.174
Similar to longer charter grants, adaptable timetables provide a 
charter school with more time to stand on its own.  Research on re-
structuring in general, and more specifically as related to charter 
conversions, has confirmed that a fast timeline for instituting restruc-
turing can lead to chaos and poor results.175  One study of states’ im-
plementation of the restructuring option under NCLB reported that 
few schools chose the chartering option, in part because the NCLB 
timetable does not align with the state’s charter application proc-
ess.176  For example, in post-Katrina New Orleans, Louisiana’s SEA 
announced in October 2004 that certain district schools would be 
converted to charter status, and the SEA awarded charter grants to 
nonprofit organizations in April 2005.177  The schools were then 
slated to open as soon as October 2005.178  Leaders involved in these 
types of conversions often desire longer planning periods, which are 
critical to success.179  It should be noted that there are avenues to cir-
cumvent the issue of stringent timelines, all of which can be adapted 
to fit within a state’s charter statute.  These solutions include allowing 
the school to be shut down for a year during renovations and plan-
ning, opening the restructured school in the earliest grade only and 
 171 Id. 
 172 CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, supra note 163, at 6–7.  According to one report, Ari-
zona was ranked as having the strongest charter school law, and the District of Co-
lumbia’s law was ranked third among the nation’s charter school laws.  Id. 
 173 Charter schools are typically founded by educators, community groups, or pri-
vate organizations.  ZIEBARTH, supra note 113, at 1. 
 174 See, e.g., NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., supra note 140, at 1. 
 175 E.g., MALEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 113–32. 
 176 WOLF DIBIASE, supra note 12, at 4. 
 177 Lili LeGardeur, Recovery Roll Call: Four Previously Failing Schools Will Open Next 
Year as State-Governed Charter Academies, LA. WEEKLY, May 30, 2005, available at 
http://www.louisianaweekly.com/weekly/news/articlegate.pl?20050530j. 
 178 ARKIN & KOWAL, supra note 112, at 15. 
 179 Id. at 15–16.  However, allowing for too much time to plan the charter school 
can “erode a very necessary sense of urgency.”  Id. at 16. 
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expanding each year thereafter, and granting the charter early, pro-
viding adequate time to plan.180
A third type of flexibility requires eliminating state-imposed caps 
on the number of charters granted.  State-imposed charter caps serve 
to limit or slow the growth of charter schools and are often employed 
as political tools in disguise.  Recent reports show that twenty-five 
states plus the District of Columbia have state-imposed caps on the 
number of charter schools.181  Moreover, there are nine states for 
which such caps are “severely constraining growth” of charter 
schools.182
State-imposed caps can take various forms, including caps on the 
number of schools or on the number of students attending the 
schools.  For example, Illinois has a “[l]imit of sixty charter schools 
for the state, with a maximum of thirty in Chicago, fifteen in Chicago 
suburbs, and fifteen in the rest of the state.”183  These restrictions pre-
sent a serious problem in Chicago, where there are currently twenty-
nine charter schools open and, therefore, room for only one more.184  
As another example, Rhode Island has a cap of twenty charters in the 
entire state, and charter schools may serve no more than four percent 
of the state’s school age population.185  Furthermore, in Missouri, 
charter schools are permitted only in Kansas City and St. Louis, and a 
maximum of five percent of the operating public schools in each of 
these cities may be converted to charters.186  With respect to state-
imposed caps on the number of students in schools, Connecticut lim-
its the percentage of students in charter schools per district, as well as 
the number of students that enroll in specific schools.187
 180 Id.  It should be noted that the problem with the last of these three solutions is 
that granting the charter early requires making an early assumption about a school’s 
AYP performance, namely that the school will fail to make AYP.  Id. 
 181 LISA STULBERG, BEYOND THE BATTLE LINES: LESSONS FROM NEW YORK’S CHARTER 
CAPS FIGHT 1 (2007), http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/download/csr_files/pub_ncsrp 
_battlelines_jun07.pdf. 
 182 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27A-4 (West 2007); see also TODD ZIEBARTH, 
PEELING THE LID OFF STATE-IMPOSED CHARTER SCHOOL CAPS 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.publiccharters.org/files/publications/file_Issue_Brief_3_09_07rgb.pdf.  
These states are Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Rhode Island, and Utah.  Id. at 1. 
 183 ZIEBARTH, supra 182, at 3–4. 
 184 Id.  “The lack of available charters will likely cause a delay in the mayor’s initia-
tive to close up to 70 low-performing schools and reopen them as 100 or more small 
schools, one-third of which will be charter schools.”  Id. 
 185 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-77-8 (2007). 
 186 MO. REV. STAT. § 160.400 (2007). 
 187 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-66BB (2007).  With aid from Governor Jodi Rell, the 
Connecticut Legislature amended this cap to allow charters with an established re-
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Proponents of caps maintain that charter schools are an un-
proven experiment; that charter schools destabilize school districts; 
that charter schools undermine systemic alteration; and that charter 
schools run contrary to the idea of public school education.188  The 
proper response to these arguments is to propose a compromise, in 
which state-imposed caps are maintained in some way.  One option is 
for states to tie caps to charter quality, as opposed to an arbitrary 
number or percentage.  Artificial limitations do not serve a valid pur-
pose, but rather are illogical or political in nature.  A second option is 
to allow schools restructuring under NCLB to convert to charter 
schools, even if this would exceed the state’s cap.189  This alternative 
would be especially helpful in school districts where there are too few 
schools to which students can transfer, thereby broadening the edu-
cational choices for students surrounded by failing schools.190
A fourth example of flexibility in a state charter law involves the 
authorizers of charter schools.  As previously mentioned, charter au-
thorizers review grant proposals and distribute charter grants.  Gain-
ing approval to establish a charter school is one of the first barriers to 
entry.191  In eleven states, limits on the number of charters that may 
be authorized by particular persons or entities exist.192  The problem 
with limiting which people can authorize charters is that political 
agendas often take center stage, and these designs “are likely to re-
distribute to charters much of the bureaucratic micromanagement 
applicable to traditional public schools.”193
Contrasting state charter school laws’ stance on authorizers 
demonstrates the drastic variation in state laws.  Again, the charter 
law in Arizona is often cited as an ideal framework.  Arizona, which 
has been ranked as having the best charter law in the nation, has the 
most number of charter schools in a state, with 469 schools operating 
cord of success to increase enrollment to eighty-five students per grade.  ZIEBARTH, 
supra note 148, at 2. 
 188 STULBERG,  supra note 181, at 2. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id.  “The relatively small number of students taking advantage of NCLB’s 
choice options in underserved communities is well documented, as are the huge 
waiting lists for public charter schools in these same jurisdictions.  The problem is 
one of supply, and one that charters can help solve.”  Id. 
 191 John F. White, Arnold F. Shober & Paul Manna, Analyzing State Charter School 
Laws and Their Influence on the Formation of Charter Schools in the United States, paper 
prepared for the Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n 2003 Ann. Meeting, Philadelphia, PA, at 9, 
http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/wcss/docs/WitteShoberManna-APSA-03.pdf. 
 192 TODD ZIEBARTH, STUNTING GROWTH: THE IMPACT OF STATE-IMPOSED CAPS ON 
CHARTER SCHOOLS 3 (2006). 
 193 Jeffries, supra note 37, at 63. 
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as of April 2007.194  Arizona allows for numerous persons or entities to 
authorize a charter grant, including local school boards, the state 
board of education, or the state board for charter schools.195  In stark 
contrast, New Jersey allows only the State Commissioner of Education 
to authorize charter schools.196
The final example of flexibility in charter laws is the ability to 
bypass case-by-case granting of regulation waivers.  Regulation waivers 
limit the number of government regulations to which the charter 
school must adhere.  Case-by-case bypassing is a severely restrictive 
means of controlling charter schools, operating as yet another obsta-
cle to achieving both flexibility and autonomy.  Some states are un-
willing to budge and refuse to bypass major regulations, while other 
states require charters schools to apply for an exemption of each 
regulation, a time-consuming and unnecessarily bureaucratic process.  
In the 2001–02 school year, only approximately two-thirds of states 
reported that charter schools were exempt from certain basic re-
quirements: the length of the school day or year (sixty-eight percent); 
faculty hiring and firing policies (sixty-five percent); and other 
teacher policies, such as tenure requirements (sixty-one percent).197  
Although waivers from regulations are often included in state charter 
laws, crucial rules concerning student achievement, governing per-
sonnel, and fiscal matters often are not initially waived.  This addi-
tional hurdle symbolizes the systemic pattern of bureaucratic obsta-
cles. 
A national survey concluded that only one-third of charter 
schools receive automatic waivers from state policies and regulations, 
while many other schools receive waivers on a case-by-case basis.198  
Once again, states vary as to their approach to waivers.  In Connecti-
cut, a charter school application may include requests to waive provi-
sions of the general statutes and regulations.199  In Nevada, certain 
exemptions from particular regulations and policies may be negoti-
ated and specified in the charter grant or requested later through a 
waiver process.200
 194 NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., NUMBER OF CHARTER SCHOOLS AND 
STUDENTS IN THE 2006–07 SCHOOL YEAR (2007), available at http://www.public 
charters.org/files/publications/2007_Charter_Numbers_1_.pdf. 
 195 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-183 (LexisNexis 2007); ECS STATENOTES, supra note 164. 
 196 N.J. REV. STAT. § 18A:36A-3 (2000). 
 197 ARKIN & KOWAL, supra note 112, at 14; SRI INT’L, EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC 
CHARTER SCHOOLS PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT 31 (2004). 
 198 SRI INT’L, supra note 197, at 31. 
 199 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-66BB (2001); see also ECS STATENOTES, supra note 164. 
 200 NEV. REV. STAT. § 386.550 (2003); see also ECS STATENOTES, supra note 164. 
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Some regulations are a necessary evil to ensure accountability for 
charter schools.  However, such government regulations should not 
severely impede upon a charter school’s need for flexibility.  Limiting 
across-the-board regulations to those including overall educational 
achievement—such as student academic growth—and procedural 
mandates—such as healthy-and-safety and anti-discrimination rules—
are sufficient to hold charter schools accountable while simultane-
ously freeing them from unnecessary constraints.201 
3. Adequate Resources 
Resources are intertwined with a school’s governance structure.  
For example, the capability to attract highly qualified teachers and 
administrators rests on the capacity to compensate these persons with 
competitive salaries.  Additionally, the ability to focus attention and 
resources on achievement rests on the ability to shift attention away 
from financial constraints.  While funding is a critical factor in pro-
viding adequate resources, money alone does not necessarily lead to 
better schools.  It is well documented that “thinly-funded schools can 
sometimes be superb and that lavishly-funded schools can be aw-
ful.”202
Critics often charge that charter schools are stealing money from 
public schools.203  However, since charters are public schools, the 
money directed toward them is not being “drained” from the public 
education system.204  Rather, it is following the student from the tradi-
tional public school to a charter school.  Unfortunately, “misin-
formed debates” regarding the financial impact of charter schools 
impedes the efforts to create high-performing charter schools.205  
Even though charter schools may cause a short-term financial nui-
sance for a school district, this effect is counteracted by viewing char-
ter schools as long-term investments, both financially and academi-
cally.206
 201 Jeffries, supra note 37, at 64. 
 202 THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING: INEQUITY’S NEXT 
FRONTIER ix (2005), available at http://www.edexcellence.net/doc/charter%20 
School%20Funding%202005%20FINAL.pdf.  This statement is applicable to both 
traditional public schools and charter schools. 
 203 MATTHEW ARKIN & BRIAN C. HASSEL, THE BOTTOM LINE: SIX MYTHS ABOUT THE 
FINANCIAL IMPACT OF PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS 1 (2007). 
 204 Id. at 2. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. at 2, 6. 
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Nevertheless, funding does matter to the survival of the charter 
school system.207  Charter laws that provide more resources in a 
timely, non-bureaucratic fashion are more likely to have high-
achieving charter schools.208  Most charter laws address funding in at 
least two ways.209  First, the charter law usually allots a level of opera-
tional funding.210  For instance, California’s charter law states that 
charters must be accorded “operational funding that is equal to the 
total funding that would be available to a similar school district serv-
ing a similar pupil population.”211  According to a study conducted by 
the Fordham Foundation, however, California charter schools receive 
31.5% less funding per pupil than traditional public schools.212  Sec-
ond, the charter law provides a list of expenses to be funded directly 
by the charter school.213  For example, Tennessee’s law states that 
charter schools are in charge of transportation costs.214
Charter schools, although a growing part of America’s educa-
tional landscape, are funded at significantly lower levels than tradi-
tional public schools.215  Concrete examples of resources include, but 
are not limited to, the following: start-up funds, per-pupil funding, 
facilities funding, leniency with debt accrual, and technical support.  
The lack of each of these resources stems from some form of a defect 
in the state’s charter law or implementation of its law. 
The first type of resource necessary for a strong charter law is 
start-up funds.  Finding money to start a charter school is a large and 
often insurmountable hurdle.  For example, if a charter organization 
knows that it will need to seek renewal at the end of its short grant, 
the organization may be less likely to commit the initial investment to 
start the school.216  Most states do not provide start-up or planning 
grants to charter schools, but of course, there are some exceptions.  
For instance, California provides charter schools with a loan fund for 
 207 Gary Miron, Strong Charter School Laws Are Those That Result in Positive Outcomes, 
THE EVALUATION CTR. AT W. MICH. UNIV., 2005, at 6, http://www.wmich.edu/ 
evalctr/charter/aera_2005_paper_charter_school_laws.pdf. 
 208 Id. 
 209 SOLVING THE CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING GAP: THE SEVEN MAJOR CAUSES AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT THEM 2 (Shaka L.A. Mitchell & Jeanne Allen eds., 2005) [Here-
inafter FUNDING GAP]. 
 210 Id. 
 211 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47630 (Deering 2007). 
 212 THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., supra note 202, at 28. 
 213 FUNDING GAP, supra note 209, at 2. 
 214 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-13-114 (2007). 
 215 THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., supra note 202, at 1. 
 216 Sheri Williams, State Foundation of Charter Schools in Kansas, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 103, 114 (2004). 
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as much as $250,000 and allows up to five years for repayment.217  
Georgia permits $5000 planning grants.218  New Mexico’s legislature 
annually appropriates money to a charter school stimulus fund to 
support both conversion and start-up charter schools.219
The next, and perhaps most powerful, ingredient for granting 
adequate resources in a strong charter law is per-pupil funding.  Most 
charter schools receive substantially less money than traditional pub-
lic schools.220  This disparity exists despite eleven state supreme courts 
having held that charter schools are public schools and are therefore 
entitled to the same financial resources as traditional public 
schools.221  According to one report, the per-pupil funding disparity 
ranged from $414 in North Carolina to $3638 in Missouri.222  On av-
erage, charter funding falls short of traditional public school funding 
by $1801 per pupil, or 21.7%.223  Only in Minnesota do charter 
schools actually receive more per-pupil funding dollars (102.4%) 
than their traditional public school peers.224
Weak charter laws automatically put charter schools at a funding 
disadvantage, particularly with respect to per-pupil funding.  For ex-
ample, New Jersey’s charter school law guarantees only ninety per-
cent of the funds that traditional public schools receive,225 but that 
percentage is not an accurate reflection of how much charters actu-
ally receive per pupil.226  New Jersey Supreme Court decisions have 
mandated “thorough and equitable” funding for impoverished 
school districts, known as Abbott Districts.227  Since the principle of 
“thorough and efficient” is a product of judicial determination, and 
New Jersey’s charter law fails to refer to this type of funding, only 
fifty-seven percent of per pupil dollars actually reaches charter 
schools in the most under-achieving Abbott Districts.228
 217 ECS STATENOTES, supra note 164. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. 
 220 THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., supra note 202, at 6. 
 221 E.g., Balt. City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs v. City Neighbors Charter Sch., 929 A.2d 
113 (Md. 2007).  See generally FUNDING GAP, supra note 209, at 1. 
 222 THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., supra note 202, at 6. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. at 1–2.  This somewhat minor advantage is a result of the needier student 
population served in Minnesota's charter schools.  Id. 
 225 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-12(b) (Supp. 2008). 
 226 FUNDING GAP, supra note 209, at 3. 
 227 See Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 454 (N.J. 1998); Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 
376, 380 (N.J. 1985); FUNDING GAP, supra note 209, at 3. 
 228 FUNDING GAP, supra note 209, at 3. 
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Other examples of state charter laws that cause a severe disparity 
between charter schools and traditional schools are easily found.  Us-
ing data from the 2001–02 school year, the Fordham Foundation ob-
served that traditional public schools in Dayton, Ohio, received 
$10,802 per pupil, whereas charter schools received only $7510, re-
sulting in a thirty percent discrepancy.229  Additionally, in 2005, the 
Franklin City School Board in New Hampshire chose to cut district 
funding for the Franklin Career Academy charter school from a flat 
$82,000 total expenditure to one dollar.230  This harsh reduction ex-
posed a major flaw in New Hampshire’s charter law, namely the local 
district’s ability to capriciously reduce funding for charter schools.231
The third example of a resource essential for a strong charter 
law is facilities funding.  Generally state laws prevent charter schools 
from receiving facilities funding, forcing charters to lease or purchase 
a building on the open market and to do so using the already limited 
per-pupil subsidy.232  On the other hand, states generally give tradi-
tional public schools a free building and state funding for additional 
capital needs.233  Since charter schools may not be allotted funds to 
purchase or lease facilities, they are forced to use money that would 
otherwise go to academic efforts.  In effect, “[w]hen charters need to 
spend operating dollars on bricks and mortar, the effort to build 
achievement can falter,”234 and they may forgo highly qualified staff.235  
The California Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Sequoia Union 
High School District v. Aurora Charter High School,236 in which a school 
district in Redwood City, California, one of the wealthiest cities in the 
state, filed suit to stop Aurora Charter School from receiving facilities 
funding.237  Sequoia argued that it had no legal obligations to 
 229 THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., supra note 202, at vii. 
 230 FUNDING GAP, supra note 209, at 3. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Jeffries, supra note 37, at 63. 
 233 Id. (citing Caroline M. Hoxby, Achievement in Charter Schools and Regular Public 
Schools in the United States: Understanding the Differences, http://www.innovations. 
harvard.edu/cache/documents/4848.pdf) (“Charter school students are more likely 
to have a proficiency advantage if their state has a strong charter school law that gives 
the schools autonomy and that ensures that charter schools get funding equal to at 
least 40 percent of the total per-pupil funding of regular public schools.”). 
 234 ZIEBARTH, supra note 192, at 5. 
 235 FUNDING GAP, supra note 209, at 8. 
 236 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 237 Id. at 90. 
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Aurora.238  The court disagreed, ruling that Sequoia must provide fa-
cilities funding.239
Yet another example of adequate resources for charter schools 
comes in the form of the state law’s stance on debt accrual.  Some 
state charter laws ban or severely limit charter schools from incurring 
debt.  One scholar notes that lifting these bans would permit charters 
to make multi-year contracts with educational service vendors, much 
like traditional public schools do.240  Furthermore, eliminating the 
debt accrual ban would allow for more efficient and stable plan-
ning.241
The DOE has created a program to alleviate some of the debt 
burdens charter schools face.  The Credit Enhancement for Charter 
School Facilities Program offers financial assistance to charter 
schools.242  In order to “leverage funds for charter school facilities, 
grant recipients may . . . guarantee and insure debt to finance charter 
school facilities.”243  This program represents the federal govern-
ment’s interest in providing aid to charter schools.  The DOE notes 
that “[u]nlike traditional local education agencies, charter schools 
often lack the ability to issue low risk, general obligation bonds 
backed by property taxes.”244  Parallel to this federal program, strong 
state charter laws include similar programs to facilitate a charter 
school’s growth and success. 
The final way in which resources impact the strength of a state’s 
charter law is through technical support.  This example is unique in 
the realm of resources, because it does not constitute traditional 
monetary support, unlike the aforementioned examples.  Technical 
assistance is “practical advice offered by an expert source that ad-
dresses specific areas for improvement.”245  Examples of technical as-
sistance include the following: data analysis (helping the school ana-
lyze results of state assessment tests), identification and 
implementation of strategies (helping the school choose effective in-
structional strategies and ensuring that the staff receives professional 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. at 94. 
 240 Martin, supra note 119, at 519. 
 241 Id. 
 242 34 C.F.R. § 225.1 (2007). 
 243 U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Credit Enhancement for Charter School Facilities, 
http://www.ed.gov/programs/charterfacilities/index.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 244 Id. 
 245 OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 6, at 14. 
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development), and budget analysis (helping the school in revising its 
budget to ensure funding that will increase student achievement).246
Technical assistance is generally provided by SEAs, charter 
school authorizers, and charter school resource centers.247  Ensuring 
that technical assistance will be provided is essential to a charter 
school’s success, particularly during the planning stages.248  This re-
source proves important in two respects.  First, similar to facilities 
funding, technical assistance allows charter schools to focus their at-
tention and economic resources on other matters.  Second, SEA-
aided assistance ensures that charter schools are successfully teaching 
students and, moreover, that students are likely to meet state stan-
dards, an issue that returns to the earlier discussion of state bench-
marks and AYP. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Achievement and accountability are the hallmarks of NCLB.  
Schools that do not meet state-mandated achievement benchmarks 
are, in turn, held accountable through a series of escalating penalties, 
from “school improvement” to “corrective action,” and ultimately 
culminating in “restructuring.”249  NCLB’s restructuring provision re-
quires schools to fundamentally reform their governance after failing 
to meet AYP for six consecutive years.250  Each of the five restructur-
ing options requires a radical, systemic change in governance.  Nota-
bly, the chartering option involves the school district closing down 
the “failing” school and reopening it as a charter school.251  On the 
surface, the charter restructuring option symbolizes a clean slate for 
the school.252  In reality, however, many state charter school laws ob-
struct the school’s ability to truly transform its governance structure 
in compliance with NCLB’s restructuring provision. 
Charter laws that bog down charter schools with unnecessary 
and stifling regulations result in schools that are materially indistin-
guishable from traditional public schools, which is inconsistent with 
the goals of NCLB.253  In order for these goals to be met, charter laws 
must possess three indispensable characteristics: autonomy, flexibil-
 246 Id. 
 247 Miron, supra note 207, at 5. 
 248 Id. 
 249 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b) (Supp. II 2002). 
 250 See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B). 
 251 Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(i). 
 252 See ZIEBARTH, supra note 148, at 5. 
 253 Smith, supra note 153, at 59. 
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ity, and adequate resources.  These elements ensure that charter con-
version schools truly represent a fundamental reform in governance, 
which is the underlying principle of NCLB’s restructuring provision.  
To do any less would betray the promise to change the culture of the 
nation’s schools in order to guarantee all children a “fair, equal, and 
significant opportunity” to attain a high-quality education.254
 254 20 U.S.C. § 6301. 
